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Chinese Strategic Culture - 
Part 2: Virtue and Power 
by Dr Rosita Dellios* 
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Research Paper No. 2 
November 1994 
Bond University 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 
ABSTRACT 
When the world's most populous nation, commanding ample resources and a booming
economy, begins to strengthen militarily, it cannot help but draw attention to itself. China
has indeed done so through naval expansion in recent years and the upgrading of all aspects
of its forces. While it has reassured the world of its peaceful intentions, speculation as to its
motives is understandable. Intentions may, of course, be inferred from capability; but most
strategic analysts recognise that capability alone is not enough. Rather than focusing on
capability, this paper subscribes to the view that intentions are better understood if
examined within the context of culture and philosophy. Moreover, as the central concern
over China's changing military profile is one of the implications of expanding national
power, Chinese perceptions of power need to be addressed. The findings can be thought-
provoking: If it is a truism that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, how
does this rest with the traditional Chinese conception of power as virtue? Will the world,
under the influence of stronger Chinese leadership conditions in the 21st Century, be
assimilated into an alternative power system - a 'power politics' of virtue? This question
issues from the discussion in Part One (previous paper) of the Daoist perspective of
international relations.(1) It concludes with the weight of cultural-philosophical evidence in
favour of responsible statecraft on the part of the world's biggest and potentially most
influential nation. 
  
Chinese Strategic Culture: Virtue and Power (2) 
Few people have difficulty recognising the greatness of Chinese antiquity even if they do
find difficulty correlating this to the events of the last 150 years. Many are familiar with
China's contemporary dimensions - an enormous country with the world's largest
population and military establishment. More recently, attention has focused on the Chinese
economy which is among the world's fastest growing. By conventional indicators, China has
the world's tenth largest Gross Domestic Product; but by the methodology based on
purchasing power parity it is hailed to be the world's third largest economy (after the
United States and Japan), and is expected to become the largest by the year 2010.(3)  
It does not take an academic to predict the return of China as a leading world power. This is
becoming abundantly clear to the casual observer. It behoves the analyst, however, to cast
light upon this condition and to speculate upon the implications of China's 'greatness' to
contemporary international society. One way of approaching this daunting task is through
the explanatory vehicle of China's strategic culture. After all, if one is to understand
strategic action, the means to global greatness, one needs to understand the strategic
thought and 'style' that underlie it. It may also be productive to infer action from strategic
thought when speculating on possible futures.   
1. Daoist and Confucian Traditions 
Two traditions prominent in Chinese strategic philosophy are Daoism (Taoism) and
Confucianism. The first refers to The Way - "the way of man's cooperation with the course
or trend of the natural world" (4) - its most famous teacher being Lao Zi (Tzu) who lived at
some time between the sixth and the fourth centuries BC. The second was propagated by
Confucius (551-471 BC), who sought harmony in social relations, and who is approvingly
referred to by the current Communist government as "a great thinker and statesman".(5)
Confucianism is essentially a humanistic tradition, elaborated by Mencius (second half of
the fourth century BC). His concern with class conflict and the right to rebel against a ruler
who has failed in his responsibility to the people (6) is also apparent in the cause of modern
Communism. Indeed Mao Zedong (Tse-tung) probably owed as much to Chinese tradition
as to Marx and Lenin. He is known to have been influenced by the classical text of Sun Zi
(Tzu), The Art of War (7) (circa 350 BC), by historic tales such as the Romance of the Three
Kingdoms, and - to use his own words - by "the works of Confucius" which Mao admitted to
studying for six years.(8) Deng Xiaoping, a great strategist politically and a highly regarded
figure by the military, has more in common with the Chinese tradition of rule by man than
rule by institution.(9) He holds no position yet he has been acknowledged as paramount
leader - a modern emperor whose 'mandate of heaven' (the command or decree from
heaven) comes from leading the Chinese people into an unprecedented era of prosperity in
modern times. This, too, is strategy: how to secure the security of the nation and its
progress. While military matters are commonly linked to the notion of security, strategic
philosophy ponders many factors in the equation of security. The strength of Chinese
defence policy is therefore dependent upon not only an appropriate level of military
deterrence, but also food security, industrial development, and advances in scientific and
technological expertise - to name only the more obvious categories of consideration.(10)  
Beyond extramilitary considerations of an essentially physical character, it is notable that the
key strategic application of both the Daoist and Confucian traditions is the endeavour to
excel through strength of character rather than force of arms. Right is might, and not the
other way round. Fulfilling one's potential comes not from actively seeking it at the expense
of the other (person, society or the environment), like a zero-sum-game ('I win, you lose'). It
comes from incorporating the other, working with the other, in line with the complementary
principles of polarity, 'yin' and 'yang'.(11) Even if that other is an opponent, one uses the
strength of the opponent to achieve one's own safety. This, of course, is a basic principle of
the martial arts. The force of an attacking opponent is not met frontally but allowed to
continue under its own momentum until it reaches its opposite condition of self-defeat. That
Buddhist monks used this martial method indicates its ethical acceptability, in addition to
its Daoist insight into the 'laws of nature', of which 'non-doing' is a central concept. (To this
belongs the idea of wu wei, or spontaneous action). Indeed, it was a Buddhist strategist,
Mingjiao of the 11th century, who wrote: "A lost country wars with weapons; a dictatorship
wars with cunning; a kingdom wars with humanitarian justice; an empire wars with virtue;
a utopia wars with nondoing."(12) 
Mao Zedong used the Daoist philosophy of achieving strength (yang) from a position of
weakness, flexibility, internal strength (yin). A 'weak' army does not directly oppose a
'strong' army. Rather, it flees to preserve itself. The 'strong' army, having entered the gates,
finds it has not conquered, but is in turn being conquered by the exertion of its task in the
face of a strategy of protracted war. For the defence, utilising guerilla warfare, there is no
hurry. Time is an ally, it erodes the enemy's commitment, while unconventional warfare
tactics prey on its morale. Mao's dictum - "the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy
camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue" (13) derives its
lineage from Sun Zi's The Art of War: "If [the enemy] is in superior strength, evade him. If he
is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where
he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected."(14)  
The emphasis on deception and surprise is not to say that Mao and Sun Zi were
unprincipled. This needs to be noted because in the West, where strategic honours have
gone to Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) for his skilful use of physical force, there is a
tendency to be dismissive of deceptive methods as 'Machiavellian' (even though Machiavelli
did write a book on virtue called Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, which the
West chose to ignore).(15) Was Mao Machiavellian when he converted a military retreat into
a propaganda victory, as he did with the Long March? Is it unprincipled to disregard the
enemy's terms of engagement and refuse to wear the markings of a combatant? Or to engage
in battle-avoidance behaviour in order to confuse the enemy, as guerilla warriors do? Far
from being unprincipled, these methods of warfare were in the service of a grander-scale
strategy, which was based on a perceived just cause - in Mao's case, opposing an aggressor
(Japan in the 1930s) or advancing the cause of the oppressed classes (through the
Communist Revolution). Thus guerilla warfare or any kind of psychological warfare is only
an enabling component of the strategy and doctrine of People's War. For Sun Zi, the use of
armed force was nothing to be proud of - "to fight and conquer in all your battles is not
supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without
fighting".(16) Moreover, "the consummate leader" must not only "adhere to method and
discipline" - that which we expect of leadership in any modern army - but also "cultivates
the moral law".(17) How many strategic studies academic centres in the West teach this
dimension? Not only are students not taught Lao Zi and Confucius, they are not normally
required to study Plato and Aristotle, let alone to cultivate themselves. In general, the
modern West uses a mechanistic model of the military: a machine which performs a
specialist function in society. What a contrast to Zhuge Liang (born around 180 AD), a
leading strategist of his day, who wrote: "The practice of a cultivated man is to refine
himself by quietude and develop virtue by frugality. Without detachment, there is no way
to clarify the will; without serenity, there is no way to get far."(18) 
Leaving aside the tradition which elevates the cultivated being, there is still the problem of
political awareness. In Chinese, 'politics' literally means 'rectification', whereby "the purpose
of the government is not only to provide food and maintain order but also to educate and
mould the people into moral subjects".(19) Politics is therefore about morality. So is power -
it equates with 'virtue'. Indeed, the one word, De (Te), can mean both.(20) Western armies
are not expected to be political. The West divides the political from the military, which
China has not done, even under the modernisation and professionalisation program of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA). In short, politics is traditionally concerned with justice and
moral order; power is based on virtue; armies are for enforcing this order. Hence the just
war doctrine (21) suits Communist and classical strategic thought alike. Within the scope of
a 'just war' is the self-defensive war which seeks to deny the enemy victory. Mao employed
it in the strategy of People's War; similarly, the classical strategist Mo Zi taught victory-
denial techniques to weak states which were at the mercy of strong ones.(22)  
'Just war', however, is not a centrepiece in Chinese strategic thought. This is because war in
itself is regarded as a phenomenon of failure, be it failure of political virtuosity in the realist
sense (Machiavelli's virtu) or of moral leadership in the Confucian sense. The discarding of
war as a tool of statecraft marks an important intersection in China's strategic cultures. At
this juncture, Sun Zi's ideal general who "breaks the enemy's resistance without
fighting" (quoted above), finds himself in the company of Mo Zi, of whom it was said:
"Teaching that social well-being derives from universal love, Mozi described warfare as
mass murder and ridiculed the states of his time for punishing individual thefts and
murders while rewarding pillage and massacre"; (23) and Mencius who, it will be recalled
from Part One (previous paper), instructed that peace could only come through unity. When
asked who could unify the world, Mencius replied: "He who does not delight in killing men
can unify it."(24) With the exception of the legalists, who did accept the instrument of force
as a legitimate tool for forging unity and thence peace, Chinese strategic culture converged
on an attitude of anti-militarism. Complementing this was the suggestion of inclusive global
security, as outlined above in the yin-yang conception of 'incorporating the other'. China's
own history taught that periods of horrific bloodshed and disorder occurred in contexts of
rivalry and disunity; while periods of stability came when there was unity in China and
Confucian suzerainty in the region.  
Western theorists have long held such views about the international system as a whole. For
instance, A. F. K. Organski wrote: "A preponderance of power on the one side . . increases
the chances of peace, for the greatly stronger side need not fight at all to get what it wants,
while the weaker side would be plainly foolish to attempt to battle for what it wants."(25)
This raises an obvious consideration as to China's return to an unassailable position while
preserving an anti-hegemonic stance. Before proceeding, however, a clarification of terms is
in order. 
2. Superpower: A Condition and a Concept 
A nation which exhibits a preponderance of power is popularly termed a superpower. There
are other terms, which sometimes overlap, to describe this condition. Hence superpower may
not necessarily be an empire which has colonised other nations, but it can be. Both superpower
and empire, in turn, need not be a hegemonic power; but it is possible to be all three. A
hegemon, for its part, need not be an empire but it does need to exercise leadership by (a)
setting the standard of international norms and rules of behaviour, and (b) acting as the
guarantor of international stability. In this role of hegemon, a superpower is more aptly
described as a metapower. Here meta is used in the original Greek sense of 'after', rather than
a theoretical layer of interpretation. Metapower refers to pervasive, indirect influence. Its
historical approximation may be identified as suzerainty. Legally, this refers to the political
control of one state over another, but historically, as Adam Watson explains, "it means a
shadowy overlordship that amounts to very little in practice".(26) More specifically, it
amounts to an international system's tacit acceptance of suzerain authority. "Tacit
acceptance is the same as acquiescence, and is necessary for any effective hegemony,
whether de jure or de facto."(27) Metapower shares with suzerainty the concept of indirect
control but adds to it the post-superpower notion of indirect power.  
A superpower which is not a hegemon but part of the balance-of-power system, including the
recent US-Soviet bipolar balance, remains a superpower. Under such circumstances it is
viewed as either attempting to maintain the balance (parity) or wishing to tip the balance in
its own favour to achieve hegemony. As will be shown below, China subscribed to the view
that both superpowers were engaged in a struggle for hegemony. With the collapse of one
superpower in 1991, there is no conclusive evidence that the other has achieved metapower
status through hegemony. On the contrary, the United States has shown signs of decline
itself, and China is wary of attempts to prop up its pseudo-legitimacy by means of support
from the United Nations. Finally, there can be approximate parity of power in a multipolar
system but a hegemon can still emerge by skilful manoeuvring. Such a hegemon need not have
a preponderance of power and would therefore not qualify as a superpower. This was
apparent in struggles for hegemony within the state system of classical Greece and China's
Warring States period prior to unification in 221 BC.  
Another term which needs to be clarified in relation to superpower is great power. Because the
USA and USSR were decidedly more powerful than the traditional great powers of Europe,
superpower entered popular usage to distinguish these two postwar giants. Some analysts,
like Hedley Bull, see no reason to discontinue great power as the defining term, saying that
the post-1945 "concept of 'super power' . . . adds nothing to the old one of a 'great power'".
(28) 
Nonetheless, superpower has managed to distinguished itself from the ageing great powers
and disreputable empires. While the Concert of Europe and the quest for colonies are no
longer fashionable in international relations, hegemony retains a following among theorists of
hegemonic stability and hegemonic governance. These pertain to the idea that a strong state is
needed as a guarantor of stability in the international system. Such was the role attributed to
postwar USA's support of global free trade. That the US also imposed economic sanctions
on 'Red China', as the PRC was called in its years of exclusion, led Beijing to take a much
more critical view of the global worth of hegemony. "To this day," Joshua Goldstein reminds
us, "Chinese leaders use the term hegemony as an insult, and the theory of hegemonic
stability does not impress them."(29)  
Yet China's past, present and future point to the working definition of superpower in
contemporary international relations: that is, a state whose power is markedly superior to
others, and which exhibits both the capability and intent to project its power globally in
support of its interests or values. China, as the Central Kingdom, did rule 'all under
heaven' (the known world) because it was both capable (and that capability included a strong
bureaucracy selected on the basis of competence in moral philosophy) and willing in
compliance with the 'mandate of heaven'. This, however, is not the condition or concept of
superpower as we have come to know it in the second half of the 20th Century. In this
period, military, economic and political power have determined status - not moral power.
Yet for China, traditionally, there is no legitimacy in having power if it is not built on a
sound moral foundation. 
The modern version of superpower is deemed by China to be morally corrupt. This is because
it is associated with the way in which the United States and the former Soviet Union
conducted their affairs. To China, the two superpowers were "the source of the world's ills"
because of their "fierce contention . . . for hegemony".(30) In short, they subsumed the rights
of others in the international community to their hegemonic quest for power. "A strong
China will never pose a threat to any country", said the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen. "China will never become a superpower."(31) To Beijing, superpower equates with
international threat. This is further evidenced by a cautious analysis of the post-Cold War
world. According to strategic analyst, Yan Xuetong, "America as the only superpower still
wants to dominate the world and is determined to maintain its military presence in East
Asia, although it has closed the Subic Base in The Philippines."(32) Other revealing
comments have issued from Beijing in recent time. "China does not approve of the
stationing of armed forces on foreign territory by any large power."(33) While the end of the
Cold War "diminished the ability of the two superpowers to manipulate world affairs",(34)
"there has been an upsurge of the tendency of big-power interference in others' internal
affairs".(35)  
The Chinese problem with the condition of superpower is corruption: power politics in the
contemporary period has pursued the path of arms races and national aggrandisement
rather than a commitment to moral order. Security became, in essence, a secularised military
problem; the concept had been barbarised. While China's humiliation was indeed inflicted
militarily and this barbarism had taught China to pay attention to the tactical necessity of
acquiring a formidable physical force, the rhetoric of moral order was never relinquished.
Such rhetoric accords with the belief in the potentialities for social transformation upheld by
both the Communist and Confucian strands of Chinese thought. As Samuel S. Kim has
noted with regard to a Chinese preference for normative power: ". . . Confucian thought
holds that seeking [material] power is a sign of moral decay. This may well explain China's
compulsive assaults on power politics."(36)  
It is true that the moral view of power does not always guide practice or appear to do so.
Nonetheless, failure to transform oneself does not negate the project. Even Confucius is said
not to have achieved his ideals of self-cultivation.(37) Despite China appearing to the West
as unscrupulous in selling missiles to the Middle East and in absenting itself from nuclear
arms reduction agreements, immoral in its human rights record, and perhaps provocative in
its military build-up in the region - points which the Chinese authorities have counter-
argued (38) - China's time honoured pronouncements still indicate the quest for moral
power. One might argue that the two superpowers did engage in a moral contention via
their competing ideologies of 'liberating the world's oppressed classes' versus 'making the
world safe for democracy'. China's view, as illustrated by its condemnatory statements, is
more sceptical. It did not approve of the way in which the rest of the world was
"manipulated" in the contest between the two strongest nations. The profession of ideals on
the one hand, and the pursuit of power politics on the other, could be viewed not only as
hypocritical but also irresponsible. Why? Because of the high nuclear force levels and the
disregard for 'justice', an ideal at the forefront of China's foreign policy rhetoric and posture.
China was the only Third World country strong enough to challenge the post-1945 world
order of superpower dominance. It acquired an independent nuclear deterrent and polished
its role of international critic, even unto the present time. The new post-Cold War order is
not only seen as potentially dangerous because of an interfering West (led by the US), but
also because of economic inequalities. This pertains to the Third World which China has
been championing for years as part of its anti-hegemony campaign. In 1991, for example, the
call for justice continued:  
As is known to all, poverty of third world countries has many causes, of which the old international
economic order and the economic relationship based on exchange of unequal values between the North
and the South, which long placed the developing countries in an unequal and unfair position, is the
main one. It will get nowhere to impose a particular Western model of development on the developing
countries instead of reforming the old economic order. Nor is armed control a fundamental remedy for
regional turbulence and conflict.(39) 
This type of rhetoric has remained strong in the post-Cold War (particularly post-
Tiananmen) era when China needs to defend its rights to non-interference in its sovereign
affairs. Beijing's commitment to anti-hegemonism conforms to the defensive phase of
people's war strategy.(40) The 'weak' side seeks to erode the capability and will of the
stronger invader (the would-be hegemon) until such a time as the final phase of strategic
counter-offensive may be launched. Upon accomplishing this task, the victorious defender
presumably would not claim the mantle of hegemon for itself. Even if it had built up the
capability to do so, it could not act in this way without forfeiting the real prize of its anti-
hegemonic war: the demonstrated victory of its own value system. China, paradoxically,
must pursue its anti-hegemonic interests if it wishes to prevail. In this respect, Taiwanese
academic Chih-Yu Shih has written a revealing book on Chinese foreign policy called
China's Just World. Shih contends that "the Chinese not only promote their interests but also
embody a worldview that explains why those interests are worth pursuing".(41)  
Unlike a traditional superpower's close identification with material power, such as number
of missiles and warheads, per capita GNP, and industrial capacity, a moral superpower
deals in the currency of normative (or soft) power as the primary means of its global
expression. This means that a nation's moral and cultural resources, the hearts and minds of
the people, are ultimately more effective than the power of missiles - and the mentality that
goes with it. As a Buddhist philosopher of old expressed the matter: "There are those who
move people by enlightened virtue and those who make people obedient by the power of
authority. It is like the phoenix in flight, which all the animals admire, or tigers and wolves
stalking, which all the animals fear."(42) 
While China could rest on the authority that comes with conventional attributes of power -
military, economic and political attributes - it is more likely to pursue 'virtue' as its raison
d'etre for an international role. Because virtue is a quality of civilisation while conventional
power attributes are more readily identified with nation-states, it is unlikely that China will
act as a supernation. To quote a review of Mark Mancall's book, China at the Centre: 300 Years
of Foreign Policy(43):  
The nation-state was not the basic unit of traditional Chinese international relations; rather, there was a
universal Sino-centric world order representing civilization as opposed to barbarism. Here, Mancall
hastens to add that "China's sense of its own civilization did not include an aggressive mission either to
civilize the rest of the world or to shoulder its burdens; the Chinese did not feel the need to bring the
blessings of their technology, religions, or governmental system to other peoples" (p. 11). Under the
Ming and the Ch'ing the tribute system of conducting foreign relations was inseparable from the other
institutions of Confucian society, all of which made up a unified whole.(44) 
  
3. Sino-Global Relations 
There are important implications here for Sino-global relations. While not being a hegemonic
superpower China can become a metapower by default. This comes from its transformative
powers over the international system with which it is increasingly interacting. While such
interaction obviously has a transformative influence on China too, there is still a widely
shared perception of the world coming to China rather than the other way around. It is a
perception which is based on China's reputation for political self-sufficiency. Being centred
in its own world, when China opens its door it is for others to come in, not for itself to step
out. In this way, the world is transformed to Chinese specifications though these, as in all
matters cultural, can never be rigorously defined. Even when its door was forced open,
China's civilisational continuity was not broken. Thus the Mongols and Manchu invaders of
imperial China were digested by Chinese culture. The same occurred with ideas adopted
from the West. Communism, socialism and capitalism were made more palatable by the
addition of 'Chinese characteristics'. If one were to imagine international relations with
Chinese characteristics, not an entirely academic exercise in view of China's growing global
influence, what would emerge? Glimpses of this world may be found in post-Confucian
East Asia, so the Confucian element of 'Chinese characteristics' is worth re-emphasising.  
Humanitarian in essence, Confucianism is not a martial philosophy. It does not set out to
conquer or clash with other economies or civilisations.(45) To the contrary, if a 'Look East'
policy (46) was adopted more widely, it could advance the cause of national vigour and
resilience in societies that do not wish to perish through lack of vision (to graft a biblical
insight to a Confucian practice).(47) Quite apart from the planned or coincidental meaning
of Mahathir's Vision 2020 for Malaysia in the 21st Century, the vision referred to here is one
invoking confidence in the moral universe and hence the overriding importance of
harmonious relationships; not conflictual or merely contractual ones. Even opposites may be
comprehended as part of an inclusive harmony. This yin-yang attribute leads to the Daoist
element of 'Chinese characteristics'.  
Like traditional Chinese and Japanese art, the context is as important as the subject. For
example, empty space is deliberately left 'empty' or in a condition of 'non-being'; the subject
thereby derives its impact or significance from the context. It may also 'lose it' to the context.
Again, deliberately so. Not from becoming cluttered but from becoming the 'context' - as in
depictions of a natural landscape with an ant-like human being traversing it. The world of
'complex interdependence',(48) which humbles the nation-state to a lower scale of
importance, is one way of thinking about the art of context-as-subject in international
relations. Another way is to ask why the usual subject of interest (the human being in a
painting or the nation-state in global politics) is so apparently insignificant. The explanation
to which I allude here is the Dao of life, including international life. The seemingly small
scale of the subject is both a factor of the 'big picture' (complex interdependence) and a
factor of the painter's own attitude. That the painter is a human being, just like the figure
depicted traversing an immense and awe-inspiring landscape, is instructive. The Dao of
international relations suggests a transcendence beyond the old power politics of the
national ego. Whoever, singularly or collectively, renders international society into these
terms is indeed a creator. This could be the new 'mandate of heaven' in global power.  
How does this translate to China's international relations? For one, the anti-hegemony
posture becomes essential. This is often difficult for the China threat theorists to accept.
Consider again the artistic analogy. Filling up empty space in a painting because it is empty
may be transposed to international terms as the filling of power vacuums whenever such a
vacuum is created. This is the dominant paradigm in international relations - the political
realist paradigm - which regards the balance-of-power as central to the maintenance of the
international system. Thus when a 'player' or 'power' (as states are called) shrinks or expires
- like Britain and the Soviet Union, respectively, then a 'power vacuum' is created. The
'instinct' is to fill it. Nature abhors a vacuum. Who fills it becomes the high point in the
realist drama, for it could be the debut of a great power. Thus it was said that 'Pax
Britannica' gave way to 'Pax Americana'. The shift and concentration of economic power to
East Asia had led many to suggest that 'Pax Americana' would give way to 'Pax Nipponica'.
More recently, 'Pax Sinica' and its various guises captured attention,(49) largely because of
its economic potential and improved relative power occasioned by the collapse of the Soviet
empire. This, of course, does not mean that China will fill the Soviet 'vacuum', or that the
remaining superpower now has the freedom to prevail. So far there does not seem to be a
ready replacement of what the Soviet Union was and represented - that is, the strategic
enemy of the West (led by America). The 'vacuum' is hardly appropriate for such elusive
candidates as Islamic 'fundamentalists' or the Confucian warlordism imagined in Chinese
and Japanese episodes of intransigence.  
If nature abhors vacuums it is because it revels in movement. The emergence of a so-called
'fluid' strategic environment in Asia should not be viewed as a period of mourning for the
'old certainties' or the gestation of new ones. Far from it, stability is in the process of
redefinition into more relevant terms. Context is increasingly defining subject. The sort of
powers that the US and the USSR represented are no longer the powers that the world
needs. Global interdependence with its "dynamic systemwide relationships"(50) is better
suited to Daoist frames of reference than adversarial contests of power; to a Confucian
emphasis on harmonious social relations than the management of stability through Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD). Within the requirements of the new context, it would appear
that China is likely to emerge as a stabilising presence. Improbable as this may seem to
human rights and pro-democracy activists, arms controllers and environmentalists, the
notion is defensible. There is an affinity between Chinese foreign policy and the rise of
normative power in international affairs, but not with its crusading methods. If China will
not be interfered with, presumably it will uphold this principle for others. It succeeded in
doing so with regard to American/UN treatment of North Korea recently. China acted
without attracting undue attention to itself, thereby demonstrating an application of 'soft
power'. Nonetheless, in view of the regular threat of 'hard power' in the New World Order
(like the old), the Chinese government remains committed to material self-strengthening.
Given the country's historic experiences, any Chinese government would. Obviously, the
sleeping dragon may awaken in an assertive and uncompromising mood. This is
particularly so if the international environment is viewed as unduly provocative. The
important point to make, however, is that Chinese strategic culture - of itself - is unlikely to
yield such a creature.  
Conclusion 
What does Chinese strategic philosophy tell us about China's future actions? That which
may be inferred from the just war mentality is a propensity for China to engage in such
wars. It has done so in modern military time (Korea in the early 1950s to oppose the
'imperialists'; and to 'teach' various lessons to India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969, and
Vietnam in 1979.) If it were to reclaim forcibly the disputed Spratly Islands in the South
China Sea, it would do so under the justification of rightful ownership. So, too, various
tracts of land to its north, in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Pacific Russia. China is
unlikely, however, to engage in warfare, if it can win back its suzerainty - should it need to
do so - by other methods. Such other means, ironically, would include the anti-hegemony
project which transcends mere irredentist claims. If China can be as self-critical as it is
critical of the dangers posed by the existing world order, it will have metapower potential. If
not, it risks attracting all the drawbacks of being a superpower - visibility, enmity and
transitoriness. Five-thousand years of statecraft capped by 100 years of humiliation have
invested contemporary China with both calculation and reflection in its power relationships.
As the Chinese President recently said to the American Secretary of State: "The fat man
didn't get that way with just one bite." (51) 
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